Recommendations from Report into misconduct risks in WA prisons tabled on 26 October 2018.

The Commission recommends:

• DoJ develop a corruption prevention framework as a matter of priority.
• Introducing a 'tenure' system where staff are rotated to avoid inappropriate relationships forming, especially where 'high risk' prisoners are housed.
• DoJ finalise and fill the new investigations structure as a matter of priority.
• DoJ consider ways to better utilise information that has been gathered to develop risk profiles.
• DoJ improve the investigations unit's access to information in TOMS.
• The implementation of such a system as well as better risk assessment for external activities and the supervising of staff.
• That DoJ:
  • develop and implement a corruption prevention framework as a matter of priority;"
  • consider creating a board of management to oversee corruption prevention strategies across DoJ;
  • finalise and implement the new structure for the investigations and intelligence units as a priority;
  • recruit appropriate staff to substantively fill available FTEs in the investigations and intelligence units, particularly in the roles of Director Investigations and Director Intelligence;
  • review policies and procedures, orders and directions, giving priority to PDs 26 and 41;
  • continue to remodel and refine the triage and assessment process, giving consideration to implementing a corruption prevention early intervention model for 'at risk' staff;
  • increase record keeping and reporting requirements for matters dealt with by local intervention to improve the investigation unit's oversight;
  • continue to review the current search and screening procedures used on entry to prisons, assess compliance and measure effectiveness of those systems and trial, assess and implement new technologies where appropriate;
  • implement recommendations from the OAG 2017/2018 Information Systems Audit Report when it is released;
  • facilitate sharing of key information from all relevant systems to the investigations unit and the respective prisons, including but not limited to, CCTV footage, drug testing, PTS, TOMS audit and intelligence databases;
  • review DoJ's drug testing regime and implement performance measures to gauge impact and effectiveness over time;
  • improve security screening processes for current and potential new employees, giving consideration to more regular screening of staff and better sharing of screening information;
  • reconsider implementing negative vetting security screening for persons routinely working with high risk prisoners;
  • consider implementing a 'tenure' system whereby front line staff are regularly rotated to avoid relationships developing with prisoners;
  • regularly review CCTV footage in all prisons to support observations of staff conduct, to identify potential 'at risk' behaviours, allow early intervention and be a deterrent for corrupt or improper activity;
  • review CCTV facilities to identify 'black spots' in all prisons and increase CCTV cameras wherever possible, with priority to higher risk areas like drug distribution areas;
  • consider centralised access to CCTV products by the investigations unit;
  • address all outstanding recommendations outlined in reports from the Commission, WA Police Force, OAG and Public Sector Commission;
  • consider pursuing legislative change to expand the drug testing program to all staff who have consistent contact with prisoners; and
  • introduce a system to track and measure the effectiveness of serious misconduct strategies that can be used for high level and operational reporting, to measure staff performance and compliance, to inform staff training and to identify where early intervention is needed to fill knowledge or security gaps and measure effectiveness of policies and procedures.