Recommendations from Report into inadequate use of force reporting at Eastern Goldfields Regional Prison in May 2017 tabled on 27 June 2018.

The Commission recommends DoJ, Superintendents and the senior management teams at prisons:

• Modify DoJ's processes and practices to ensure a separation of use of force reporting duties, including:
  • prohibit the primary user of force from reviewing or actioning the Incident Description Reports of other prison officers who witnesses, or were involved in the incident;
  • remove the ability for the primary user of force to prepare or be involved in the preparation of DoJ records concerning the use of force, save for their own Incident Description Report; and
  • highlight mechanisms for staff to confidentially report officers who are suspected, on reasonable grounds, of not completing Incident Description Reports independently.
• Support and regularly promote awareness of confidential mechanisms for staff to report potential criminal activity and misconduct concerning prison officers using force against prisoners.
• Conduct mandatory training for prison officers in relation to independent, accurate and factual reporting of use of force incidents that includes:
  • the use which can be made of a prison officer's reports in legal, administrative, disciplinary and prison offence proceedings;
  • the consequences of colluding, making false or inaccurate statements or omitting material matters; and
  • the interrelation between reporting on use of force incidents and an officer's duties and oath under the Prisons Act.
• Take action against prison officers who make inaccurate statements or material omissions from IDRs, or who do not submit an IDR when required to do so. Maintain a register of the action taken.
• Update PDs to provide clarity on who receives notifications about use of force incidents, what responsibilities must be discharged and how DoJ records the notification process.
• Update PDs to provide clarity on the independent review of use of force incidents by DoJ personnel outside of the prison facility where the incident occurred. The policy should:
  • identify a position that is responsible for the review process:
  • identify who will conduct reviews;
  • establish a framework for conducting reviews (including a mandatory requirement to review CCTV footage of the incident, where available);
  • provide mechanisms to convey the review results to designated Superintendents; and
  • outline the designated Superintendent's responsibilities when he or she receives the review results.
• Update, monitor and audit systems (including TOMS), processes and physical spaces to reduce the opportunity for prison officers to collude about their IDRs or otherwise view or copy the IDRs of others.
• Take action against prison officers who use force against prisoners in circumstances where they have not completed a DoJ approved training programme or have not discharged mandatory requirements to refresh their annual training.
• Consider introducing stricter controls over the storage, issue , possession and use of chemical agent, a controlled weapon.